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The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential
Framework For Self-Determination

Tmess.

PHILIP J. HARTER*

he law governing the confidentiality of mediation is currently a

Parties regularly expect that what they tell the mediator
in confidence will remain just between them, and mediators
regularly promise virtually complete confidentiality to the participants. 1
Perhaps in response to the recognition that mediation can and does play an
important role in resolving society's disputes by encouraging selfdetermination by the parties and that confidentiality is an essential
ingredient for making mediation work, Congress and the state legislatures
have enacted statutes to provide it. Unfortunately, however, they have
passed literally hundreds of them. 2 As a result, the law governing
confidentiality varies by subject matter within a state and by jurisdiction
Moreover, the differences can be quite
within a substantive area.
significant. And, the parties to a mediation can never know just where a
challenge to confidentiality might be brought or even whether it will be
directly related to the subject on the table. As a result, the parties cannot
know whether what they think is confidential will be in another jurisdiction
when an action might take place or as to parts of a mediation that might fall
outside a narrowly drawn statute. Further, mediators often promise more
confidentiality than they can actually deliver as a matter of law and since
many parties are unrepresented by counsel, they may rely on this assurance
to their detriment.
While, given the potential for confusion, remarkably few cases have
actually arisen that test and define the law, the process of mediation would

*
Director, Program on Consensus, Democracy & Governance, Vermont Law
School and a practicing mediator with The Mediation Institute, Washington, DC. Former
Chair, Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice of the American Bar
Association and its official observer to the Uniform Mediation Act.
1. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators adopted by the Sections of
Dispute Resolution and Litigation of the American Bar Association, the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the American Arbitration Association provide that
"A Mediator shall maintain the reasonable expectations of the parties with regard to
confidentiality," availableat
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/modelstandards_of_conductfor-m.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2002).
Prefatory Note to Uniform Mediation Act, supra p. 166-78.
2.
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benefit greatly by having a defined minimal set of rules 3 by which it
operates so the parties and the mediator can have some assurance as to the
consequences of their actions. They could then tailor their actions
accordingly, such as by entering into contracts that further clarifies and
defines their relationship. 4 The Uniform Mediation Act was developed to
meet that need.
The UMA is the product of heroic effort that brought together many
interests and perspectives to thrash out a workable framework for
mediation. Virtually anyone could quibble with - of flat out stridently
oppose - provisions of the act. But, on the whole it is a functional piece
of work. The critically important part - whatever one's views as to just
how confidentiality should work - is that the UMA would establish a
consistent and predictable structure for mediation. Everyone would then
know what to expect and can tailor their actions accordingly.
Since I was the official observer of the Section of Administrative Law
and Regulatory Practice, it is not surprising that I see in the UMA some
analogy to the seminal Administrative Procedure Act which forms the basis
for how government agencies make decisions. The APA, like the UMA,
defines the basic "rules of the road" for their respective areas. Given that,
Justice Jackson's observations in the first case that reviewed the APA are
apt here as well:
The Act thus represents a long period of study and strife; it
settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and
enacts a formulation upon which opposing social and
political forces have come to rest. It contains many
compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some
ambiguities. Experience may reveal defects. But it would
be a disservice to our form of government and to the
administrative process itself if the courts should fail, so far

3.
Mediation is used in an extraordinarily broad range of settings from settling
nettlesome disputes between neighbors, to divorces, to the resolution of complex business
deals, to the enforcement of laws, and to the development of the legal requirements
themselves. As a result, the process of mediation itself must be flexible and responsive to
the ability of the parties to devise a procedure that meets the needs of the particular matter.
Thus, the law governing mediation needs to provide for that adaptation and growth.
4.
For example, a statute might provide for some but not total confidentiality of
information exchanged during a mediation.
The parties could then agree among
themselves - and the mediator - that they would not seek to use any of that information
for any other purpose. Thus, while not binding on non-parties, the agreement would
supplement the statutory protections.
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as the terms of the Act warrant, to give effect to its
remedial purposes where the evils it was aimed at appear. 5
substantive and
This essay reviews several salient points procedural - of the UMA to the end that some might be clarified in
practice and that we might learn from the experience for application to new
endeavors.
I. THE PRIVILEGE

The heart of the UMA is its privilege against disclosure of mediation
communications. Section 4(a) provides that "A mediation communication
is privileged and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a
proceeding." 6 Thus, a party "may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any
While it
other person from disclosing, a mediation communication.7
note
First
sounds simple, there is actually a lot going on in that sentence.
that it applies only in a proceeding - that is, the confidentiality provided
by this section extends only to formal proceedings, largely adjudicatory
actions before courts, agencies and arbitrators, but also including legislative
Importantly, it does not* impose a duty to maintain
proceedings.
confidentiality on anyone. Thus under the act someone could leave the
mediation and hold a press conference with a "he said and she said"
narrative of what just went on, but could nonetheless refuse to "tell it to the
judge." 8 Next, it allows the holder of the privilege to refuse to reveal a
mediation communication. A mediation communication is defined broadly
to include oral, written and nonverbal statements during a mediation, and
those made while convening a mediation or while selecting a mediator.
The refusal to reveal is pretty straight forward: the holder is asked and
simply says no. But the next part gets dicey: the holder of a privilege may
also block the others from tattling. Again it is easy if someone offers the
mediation communication in a proceeding in which the person holding the
privilege is also party, but what if the holder does not know anything about
it? How is the person to suppress the revelation unless s/he is aware that it
is happening? The proposal does not address the issue squarely since this
section does not impose a duty on anyone to maintain confidentiality. The

5.

6.

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1950).

UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(a), supra p. 197.
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b), supra p. 197.

7.
And that was the theory of the drafting of the UMA until the last few hours
8.
when some potentially significant changes were made. See Part I infra at p. 255.
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Reporters' Notes suggest that the parties enter into a contract that will
commit everyone either to maintain confidentiality or to provide notice to
all parties of a demand for or an intent to disclose a mediation
communication.
The privilege will likely work well for business disputes and for
others that use an experienced mediator who will bring to the process some
boilerplate language to address these issues. But, the need for addressing
confidentiality outside of the courtroom and notice to the other parties
when demands are made are a very large traps for the unwary. And, even if
someone is aware of them and enters into a contract for confidentiality and
notice, what is the measure of damages for a breach? To be sure the same
issue would arise if the statute imposed a duty of confidentiality and of
notice, but at least the requirement could be clear and it could also provide
that any information that is revealed in violation of the duty is not
admissible in a proceeding. 9 Perhaps one way around this dilemma is to
interpret Section 4(a) as meaning that no mediation communication may be
admitted into evidence unless all relevant people have waived the resulting
privileges; thus, there would be a ban unless authorized instead of forcing
someone to come forward to assert the privilege and, in the words used in
the commentary, to "block" admission.
In a decision that took a lot of discussion and debate and generated
much consternation, the privilege also extends to allowing the mediator to
refuse to reveal a mediation communication, even if the parties urge the
mediator to sing, and to prevent anyone else from disclosing a mediation
0
communication of the mediator.1
Thus, the mediator can refuse a
discovery request for or refuse to testify about a mediation communication,
but the mediator cannot block others from doing so. The reason for this
privilege is that experience has shown far too many times (and I personally
bear a prominent scar) that when a mediator testifies, some party or another
will likely be hurt by the testimony and will repudiate the entire agreement
on the ground that the mediator was biased or some such thing; moreover,
the mediator has no information that is not shared by at least one party
other than his or her own impressions and they should be kept to the

9.
For example, the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act provides: "Any
dispute resolution communication that is disclosed in violation of [the duties provided in the
Act] shall not be admissible in any proceeding relating to the issues in controversy with
respect to which the communication was made." 5 U.S.C. §574(c) (2001).
10.
"A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may
prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator."
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(2), supra p. 197.
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mediator." I Thus, if the parties ask the mediator to testify as to something
or another, the mediator can determine whether the testimony would be
such as would jeopardize or enhance the process.12
Finally, in another controversial call, a non-party participant in the
such as an expert witness or someone who accompanies a
mediationparty - may refuse to disclose and may prevent others from disclosing
that person may not, however,
communications made by that participant;
13
others.
by
done
or
said
block anything

II. THE ELUSIVE CONFIDENTIALITY
Until the very last meeting of the drafting committee, the entire thrust
of the proposed UMA was the evidentiary privilege. The thought was that
many people who would mediate under the Act would not be terribly
sophisticated legally and would logically and normally talk about what
went on with their friends and colleagues, and that it would be unfair to
subject them to sanctions or duties when they simply were not aware of the
requirements. So, the thought was that if parties wanted a broader
requirement of confidentiality, they could impose a duty on themselves to
remain silent beyond that of the privilege by entering into a contract to do
so; and, indeed, that is a common practice. But that caused an awful
disquiet: confidentiality is commonly thought to mean more than simply
keeping the communications away from adjudicatory bodies and if one is
worried about the unsophisticated, this is a snare in waiting.
It was decided in the final meeting of the drafting committee that
something had to be done to extend the protection and make the Act more
The committee therefore
in keeping with common understandings.
changed the lead in sentence to Section 5 to read "A mediation
communication is confidential and, if privileged, is not subject to discovery
or admissible in evidence in a proceeding.'; 14 The word "confidential" was

Nevertheless, some hold strongly to the view that the mediation process belongs
11.
to the parties, and consequently if they waive all privileges then the mediator should testify.
Thus, under this view, the parties and not the mediator hold the privilege. That is, of course,
akin to the attorney client privilege.
Testifying may be perfectly appropriate, for example, if a party had died and
12.
the mediator would authenticate his signature on the agreement and participation in the
mediation.
"A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other
13.
person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant." UNIF.
MEDIATION AcT § 4(b)(3), supra p. 197.
Section 5, as it is quoted here, no longer exists. For the Uniform Mediation
14.
Act's coverage of confidentiality, see UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8, supra p. 227; Eds.
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not defined nor further explained; rather, it stood there starkly. The
undercurrent was that its inclusion would impose some sort of duty on
those who participate in a mediation, but its contours were not defined.
Rather, it would be up to the courts to pour specific meaning into the term:
whatever duty there is and whatever restrictions on use there may be. In
short, it was an invitation to develop a common law of confidentiality.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) was bothered by the inclusion of some sort of duty of
confidentiality in the section on privilege, and significant changes were
made. The confidentiality was excised from Section 5 and put in a separate
section that says:
Unless subject to the [open meetings act/open records act],
mediation communications are confidential to the extent
agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of
this State.' 5
The change has two important consequences as compared to the draft
going to the floor of NCCUSL. First, it does not in itself impose a duty of
confidentiality nor invite the courts to define its contours. Second, unlike
the draft, the provision explicitly authorizes the parties to define their own
confidentiality by saying that a contract to that end is enforceable. 16 While
that may sound redundant with normal contract law it is significant for
three reasons. The first is symbolic since the statute would specifically
mention it and hence legitimize that which mediators have been promising
since they existed. Second, it alone can serve as an important notice to
potential parties that they need to address what happens outside the
courtroom. Third, without such a provision the argument could be made
that the privilege provided by the statute is as far as the legislature wanted
to go with respect to confidentiality in which case any agreement that
purported to require confidentiality beyond that specified in the UMA
would be void as against public policy.

UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8, supra p. 227.
16.
Thus, for example, the parties can agree that they will maintain confidentiality
at all times and not just in proceedings and that they will provide notice to the other parties
if anyone makes a demand for a mediation communication.

15.
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
Like all privileges, there are exceptions and qualifications.
Importantly, the exception to privilege does not extend to the agreement
that results from the mediation so that a resulting agreement is not
privileged, 17 although it could still be confidential under Section 8. In a
matter that was important to the Section of Administrative Law, the
privilege does not apply to mediation communications that are available
for example, a state agency may
under a state's open records actnegotiate a compliance agreement with a company in a closed negotiation
but the agency may still be required to supply the mediation
communications under its open records act.' 8 Nor does the privilege extend
to a mediation communication that is made during a session of a mediation
that is open to the public - it would surely be anomalous if someone made
a statement in front of many non-participants but later claimed a privilege
and refused to furnish the statement to a court - or even if the meeting
was closed but required to be open (alas, there are many such animals)
under a state's open meetings law.' 9 Threats to inflict bodily injury are not
protected 2° nor are communications that are intentionally used to plan,
commit or conceal an ongoing crime. 2' There are other exceptions
22 and professional
concerning the welfare of vulnerable populations
misconduct.23
An important provision, Section 6(b), allows the tribunal to override
the privilege in narrowly drawn circumstances. First, the tribunal must
hold a hearing in camera and make three findings: (1) the party seeking the
material has demonstrated that it is not otherwise obtainable; (2) "there is a
need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting
confidentiality;" and (3) the mediation communication is sought or offered
in a court proceeding involving a felony or a proceeding to prove a claim or
defense sufficient to reform or avoid liability on a contract arising from the
mediation. 24

17.

18.
19.
20.

21.

22.
23.
24.

UNIF. MEDIATION ACT
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT

Id.

UNIF.
UNIF.
UNIF.
UNIF.
UNIF.

MEDIATION
MEDIATION
MEDIATION
MEDIATION
MEDIATION

ACT
ACT
ACT
ACT
ACT

§ 6(a)(1), supra p. 210.
§ 6(a)(2), supra p. 210.
§ 6(a)(3), supra p. 210.
§ 6(a)(4), supra p. 210.
§ 6(a)(7), supra p. 210.
§ 6(a)(5-6), supra p. 210.
§ 6(b)-6(b)(2), supra p. 210.
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IV. CONCERN THAT MATTERS OF PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND
WELFARE WILL BE SUPPRESSED

The very first submission of the Section of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice addressed an issue it believed was of importance to the
public health and welfare:
It seems clear that there will be instances when it is simply
more important to reveal what was learned in a mediation
than to maintain confidentiality as an aid to reaching
agreements in that or future cases. The public health and
safety may be directly implicated, or some other serious
matter of the public welfare. For example, the mediator
may learn that a barrel of a highly toxic chemical lies just
beneath the local playground or that some product poses a
very real danger to potential users. Or, it may be that one
of the participants is so upset with what happened that s/he
plans to seriously harm someone. In these instances the
strong presumption of confidentiality - which is essential
for mediation to work successfully should be
overridden and the facts revealed, but only to the extent
necessary to address the concern. The question is: who
decides and by what standards.

We appreciate this provision is controversial within the
mediation community, and that there are those, perhaps
many, who advocate that courts should not play a role in
deciding whether and when to breach confidentiality. We
respectfully disagree. As stated above, there are situations
in which it is important to reveal what was said; many lives
may turn on it; an individual's immediate health or welfare

25.
After these comments were submitted, the grave safety issues surrounding the
Ford Explorer and Firestone Wilderness tires became well known. That case can serve as a
vital example: Suppose a mediator undertook a product liability mediation on the reasonable
assumption that the issue involved a specific manufacturing defect, but during the process it

became clear that many people were at severe risk of death.
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may be at stake. Thus, someone needs to make that
determination. If it is the mediator - or one of the
parties - that person has a horrible conflict of interest:
whether to maintain the confidentiality that surrounds the
process or decide whether what was just heard is of
sufficient magnitude to merit public disclosure; both needs
will be tugging at the participant. How are the other
participants to regard each other and the mediator if any
one of them can suddenly decide unilaterally and without
notice to tell all? Surely concern and distrust will develop
that will, in itself, inhibit the very free flow of information
that confidentiality is designed to encourage. In addition,
the decision will be standardless - what the individual
believes should be revealed. Thus, we think it is better to
remove that conflict of interest and have some outside
person strike the difficult balance (except, of course, in
cases of imminent harm in which there simply is not
enough time to ask anyone else to decide in which case the
mediator must make the hard choice).26
Courts are the institution we use for making judgments that require the
balancing of competing societal needs, and they are the logical place to
make the determination here. In fact, when confronted with such a choice,
courts are likely to make these decisions anyhow. Finally, if a court strikes
the balance and orders a party or a mediator to reveal what was said, that
would likely clothe the actual disclosure in immunity, so that mediators
would not be liable for complying with judicial orders whereas they may
well incur liability for striking the wrong balance if they make the decision.
courts. 27
Thus, the Section concurs in placing this responsibility in the
The Federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which the
28
Section had a major role in drafting, has such a provision. And,
throughout most of the drafting process, the draft UMA did likewise by
including a health and safety provision in what became Section 7(b) that is

Comments of the Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice on the
26.
June, 1999, Draft of the Uniform Mediation Act (on file with author).
Id.
27.
Confidentiality can be overridden when "a court determines that such testimony
28.
or disclosure is necessary to... prevent harm to the public health and safety of sufficient
magnitude in the particular case t outweigh the integrity of dispute resolution proceedings in
general by reducing the confidence of parties in future cases that their communications will
remain confidential." 5 U.S.C. §574(a)(4) and (b)5).
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discussed above. At the last meeting of the drafting committee, however, a
number of people thought such a provision would hurt the chances of
mediating product liability cases. It was deleted but only because under
the draft then on the table there would be no duty on the part of the
mediator - or anyone else for that matter - not to tell the authorities, and
they could go ahead and do so. Thus, the provision was, at the time,
supererogatory. Moreover, to the extent the courts would define the nature
of confidentiality in an evolving and responsive "common law," at least the
AdLaw Section would trust them to recognize the need to protect the public
and carve out an exception for the public health and safety under suitable
safeguards that balance competing needs. Although we would have
preferred that the "override" stay in to make it clear that a mediator who
learned something nasty might happen could apply to a court for a
determination as to whether confidentiality should be breached, we "could
live with"- good mediation term there- the provision as it emerged
from the drafting committee.
The incarnation of confidentiality in the final version of the UMA
raises concern. It no longer provides for a common law evolution of
confidentiality but instead authorizes the parties themselves to define its
parameters beyond the testimonial privilege. To be sure, a mediator could
say to the parties that s/he would not mediate a case without some ability to
reveal information that has important societal consequences. But, it is
likely that competitive pressures will mean that parties will insist that
mediators agree up front not to reveal anything, anytime, for any reason,
period. If that fear materializes and the courts sustain it, as indeed the
UMA seems to contemplate since it permits of no explicit exceptions, then
the concerns of the AdLaw Section are not met since important information
that may save lives will in fact be suppressed.
We believe that somewhere the UMA should indicate there are limits
on the ability to contract for complete confidentiality. For example the
commentary to the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provides
that "[t]he mediator shall not disclose any matter that a party expects to be
confidential unless given permission by all parties or unless required by
law or other public policy. '29 Thus, the standards recognize in the
confidentiality provision that there are limits to the confidentiality based on
public policy. Although not directly relevant to the question in issue, this
summer the American Bar Association revised the standards of conduct to
authorize a lawyer to "reveal information relating to the representation of a
29. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, availableat
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/model_standards_of_conduct-for-m.htm
Mar. 26, 2002).

(last visited
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client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm., 30 The reporter's
Commentary explains the provision thusly:
Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and
physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it
will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and
substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a
later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to
eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a
client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's
water supply may reveal this information to the authorities
if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who
drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or
debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is
to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of
necessary
3
victims. '
This provision only authorizes the lawyer to disclose information in
these situations, not that s/he has to. And, indeed, perhaps the lawyer could
agree at the outset of representation not to do so. But, the modification
indicates at minimum that the ABA recognizes there are important limits
on confidentiality.
Given the current configuration of the UMA, we would prefer if the
health and safety exception were included in the "override" provision of
Section 6(b) to make it very clear that there are limits. But, barring
something quite unexpected, that is not likely to happen. Given that, it
would be helpful - indeed essential - to include a discussion in the
Reporter's notes that there are public policy limits on contracts for
confidentiality and that anyone learning of a risk to the public that meets
the criteria described in the ABA's Rule 1.6 would nevertheless be able to
apply to a court for a declaratory judgment, after a hearing in camera, that
the contract does not restrict similar disclosures.

The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Rule 1.6(b)(1), supra note 29.
30.
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Commentary to Rule 1.6, par.
31.
6, supra note 29.
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V. PROCESS

As has been discussed elsewhere in this book,3 2 the process used to
craft the UMA was novel and complex. Like a giraffe, it looked a bit
ungainly, but its form largely fit its function. In the past, NCCUSL would
draft and adopt a uniform act and then submit it to the ABA for its
approval. The issue would come before the ABA's House of Delegates on a
"closed rule"- the decision was either up or down, but no amendments
were allowed. In this case, the ABA had at least as much, and probably
considerably more, expertise in the subject matter than NCCUSL and was
moving towards a similar goal. Thus, the usual procedure would not be
particularly productive since the ABA would want to have its own views
incorporated into the draft and not simply endorse the work of others. The
drafting process, therefore, had to accommodate the needs of both
organizations. Perhaps, given the rules and requirements of each, the
structure was about as good as it could be. But, in the interests of learning
from experience in case there is some wiggle room for modifications, it is
worth stepping back briefly for at least one participant's observations.
As one who represented an ABA entity as official observer, I felt
throughout the process that the ABA was clearly a stepchild. To be sure,
some of the problems were self-inflicted since half of the ABA members
rarely showed up. During the deliberations, the ABA Reporter was clearly
not accorded equal status. Thus, if there is to be a future collaboration, this
ABA'er would clearly prefer a parity of participation. Indeed, the dual
committees that strove to make sure there were no differences - and very
rarely if ever were there any - seem unnecessarily ungainly. A jointly
appointed committee or a single committee with tailored decision processes
that would protect the needs of each sponsoring organization would seem
to be far preferable and efficient.
Further, the participation of the official observers known
throughout as "the observer corps" - was extremely helpful since it was
largely they who had the practical insights into the issues, and I need to
emphasize my appreciation for both my own participation and that of other
mediators. My own view - colored, of course, by where I sat and my dayto-day experience with negotiated rulemaking and its convening
processes - would be that future actions like this would benefit from
having a single committee consisting of representatives of NCCUSL, the
ABA, and whatever subject matter was under development, in this case, the

32.
Judge Michael Getty, The Process of Drafting the Uniform Mediation Act,
supra pp. 157-64.
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mediation community. That joint committee would have one reporter who
would be responsible for developing the drafts and scholarly input. My
view is that such a committee would engage in more productive and
engaging discussions than the necessarily awkward differentiation between
committee members - we - and observers - they.
VI. PARTICIPATION OF THE MEDIATOR COMMUNITY

As one final note which probably reflects a lawyerly concern, it
seemed to me that in many of the discussions a number of representatives
of the mediation community seemed focused, and adamantly so, on
mediation as an end in itself and not as part of a broader societal activity.
Thus, there tended to be an absolutism, and a view that only the mediator
could make various decisions, that fails to recognize that while mediation
in an important means to self-determination and an important means to
making hard decisions, there are other, competing considerations that must
at times be balanced. That view was also at times propounded with a
stridency that was inimical to a group deliberation and consideration that
can only hurt in the long run.
It is my fervent hope that as mediation matures into a broadly
accepted practice, the mediation community will recognize and accept that
other actors may at times need to make decisions that will affect the
practice and that government agencies will allow mediation to function
fully without trying to manipulate its processes.33
CONCLUSION

The development of the Uniform Mediation Act took a heroic effort of
a lot of people. In the end, it is no one's ideal approach; no one will see it
as perfect. Indeed, when drafting a proposed statute on confidentiality, I
took a very different approach. But, it reflects the results of robust
discussions and careful deliberations over a broad range of issues
developed by widely divergent interests. It provides a very workable
framework for mediation consistent across the incredible breadth of issues
and across the complex of jurisdictions. Its broad adoption will further the

33.
See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Fearof Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents,
46 DuKE L.J. 1389 (1997). For example, as this essay is being written, a government
agency is proposing that it can unilaterally, and in derogation of the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act, define the contours of confidentiality for the mediation of issues that arise
under its administration.
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establishment and use of mediation to the end of broader self determination
and better decisions.
With all the concerns expressed here and a few more to boot, I am
proud to have been a participant in its development and proudly proposed
that the Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice be a cosponsor of the Uniform Mediation Act when it is taken up by the ABA's
House of Delegates, which the section readily agreed to do.

